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DOES THE FEDERAL ARBITRATION ACT MANDATE THE
HOLDING OF BOWEN V. AMOCO PIPELINE COMPANY?
ARLYN CROW

I. INTRODUCTION

The Federal Arbitration Act (FAA) limits judicial scrutiny of arbitration awards
to cases where there is fraud, evident bias, or corruption, or where arbitrators exceed
their authority.' Because of this limited review, parties wary of the arbitral decisionmaking process have attempted to expand the scope of judicial review by private
contract, inserting ajudicial review clause in the arbitration agreement to expand the
scope of review beyond that articulated in the FAA in the hopes that the court will

enforce the clause. The Ninth and Fifth Circuit Courts have allowed parties to
expand the scope of judicial review by contract, finding that United States Supreme
Court precedent mandates the enforcement of arbitration agreements and requires
courts to enforce clauses that expand judicial review according to their terms. 2 Yet
the Tenth Circuit, standing alone, has refused to enforce these contract clauses
beyond the review articulated in Section 10 of the FAA and the "manifest disregard
of the law" exception articulated in Wilko v. Swan.3 In Bowen v. Amoco Pipeline
Company,4 the Tenth Circuit concluded that the "purposes behind the FAA, as well
as the principles announced in various Supreme Cases, do not support a rule
5
allowing parties to alter the judicial process by private contract.,
Though there may be advantages to allowing private parties to expand judicial
review beyond the standards articulated in the FAA and the common law, the

expansion of judicial review by private contract has met with considerable
controversy. 6 One side argues that the expansion will impair the efficiency and

* Class of 2003, University of New Mexico School Of Law. I would like to thank Professor M.E.
Occhialino for his wonderful insights and comments on this note. He was an invaluable resource and is a wonderful
teacher. Of course, all mistakes are solely those of the author. I would also like to thank my father and mother,
whose belief in my abilities has pushed me to accomplish goals that I could have never imagined. I thank you.
1. See generally 9 U.S.C. §§ 10-11 (1994). The courts have also crafted a "manifest disregard to the law"
exception to supplement Sections 10 and 11. Wilko v. Swan, 346 U.S. 427 (1953). The Tenth Circuit has interpreted
this "manifest disregard" exception to mean, "the record will show the arbitrators knew the law and explicitly
disregarded it." Bowen v. Amoco Pipeline Co., 254 F.3d 925, 932 (10th Cir. 2001). This manifest disregard of the
law exception is rarely applied. See, e.g., Stephen L. Hayford, Law in Disarray: Judicial Standards for Vacatur of
CommercialArbitrationAwards, 30 GA. L. REV. 731,764-74 (1996); see also Cameron L. Sabin, The Adjudicatory
Boat Without a Keel: Private Arbitrationand the Need for Public Oversight of Arbitrators,87 IOWA L. REV. 1337,
1349-50 (2002).
2. Gateway Techs., Inc. v. MCI Telecomms. Corp., 64 F.3d 993 (5th Cir. 1995); La Pine Tech. Corp. v.
Kyocera Corp., 130 F.3d 884 (9th Cir. 1997).
3. Bowen v. Amoco Pipeline Co., 254 F.3d 925 (10th Cir. 2001); Wilko, 346 U.S. at 436-37.
4. 254 F.3d 925 (10th Cir. 2001).
5. Id. at 933.
6. See generallyHans Smit, ContractualModification of the Scope of JudicialReview ofArbitralAwards,
8 AM. REV INT'L ARB. 147 (1997) (arguing that contractual modification is socially undesirable and contrary to
law); Kenneth M. Curtin, Contractual Expansion and Limitation of Judicial Review of ArbitralAwards, 56 DisP.
RESOL. J. 74, 81 (2001) (noting that "a strict, unguided adherence to the principle of freedom of contract needs to
be tempered with a respect for the arbitration process"); Sabin, supra note I (arguing that private expansion of
judicial review will not give the necessary credibility to the arbitral process, but public oversight will). But see Alan
Scott Rau, Contracting Out of the Arbitration Act, 8 AM. REV. INT'L ARB. 225 (1997) (arguing that the Ninth
Circuit's decision in La Pine was correct and the courts should allow for expanded review for questions of legal
error); Stephen J. Ware, "Opt-in "for Judicial Review of ErrorsofLaw under the Revised Uniform ArbitrationAct,
8 AM. REv. INT'L ARB. 263 (1997) (finding that arbitrators often do not apply the law and the courts still enforce
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overall usefulness of arbitration, while the other side argues that it will assuage
parties' fears of maverick arbitrators, thus increasing the use of arbitration and
decreasing the size of court dockets.7 Both sides argue within the limits of the FAA,
either taking the side that the policies of the FAA, and the interpretations by the
Supreme Court, mandate private contractual expansion or that the FAA policies
would be frustrated if this expansion is allowed. In Bowen, the Tenth Circuit takes
the latter view in this argument that expansion of judicial review would not benefit
8
the arbitral process; therefore, the goals of the FAA are not furthered. Though this
issue is interesting, these concerns have been addressed in considerable depth by
9
others and will not be discussed in any depth in this note. Instead, this note will
argue that there is no indication in case precedent or in the FAA that it either
prohibits or requires private contractual expansion of judicial review. Because there
is no precedent or policy requiring this result,'0 and the arguments for and against
expansion of judicial review both have merit," the issue seems to be whether or not
the courts should allow for the expansion of judicial review by private individuals
based on its effects on the court system.
The Tenth Circuit briefly addresses this policy reason, stating that private
individuals should not be able to tell the courts the level at which they must review
an award.' 2 The Tenth Circuit's rationale implies that if the courts allow parties to
an arbitration agreement to expand judicial review, they would be allowed to affect
the rules of the courts, an action they could not do had they chosen to go to court
directly.13 This, in turn, usurps congressional powers to establish rules and
procedures of the courts by allowing private individuals to establish these rules
4
under a guise of deference to the policies of the FAA.' This rationale not only
state courts to experiment with
furthers the goals of the courts but also
5 allows
provisions.'
"opt-in"
created
statutorily
the award, therefore "opt-in" review is sound policy); Tom Cullinan, Note, Contracting for an Expanded Scope of
Judicial Review in Arbitration Agreements, 51 VAND. L. REV. 395 (1998) (arguing that Supreme Court decisions
require that courts allow for contractual modification of judicial review); Stephen P. Younger, Agreements to
Expand the Scope of Judicial Review ofArbitration Awards, 63 ALB. L. REV. 241 (1999) (reasoning that expanded
judicial review for legal error may help quell maverick impulses of arbitrators).
7. For a general discussion of these two arguments, see Rua, supra note 6, and Smit, supra note 6. The
Tenth Circuit did recognize that expansion of judicial review may reduce the burden on the district courts. Bowen,
254 F.3d at 936 n.6 ("Expanded standards of review.. .reduce[ ] the burden on district courts.").
8. Bowen, 254 F.3d at 936 (stating, "expanded judicial review... reduces arbitrators' willingness to create
particularized solutions.").
9. See articles listed supra note 6.
10. Id. at 934 (noting that the Supreme Court has never said parties are free to interfere with the judicial
process).
11. See supra note 6.
12. Bowen, 254 F.3d at 934.
13. The Tenth Circuit also recognized that parties to a contract may be attempting to create federal
jurisdiction because courts would have to vacate awards they would not otherwise vacate and rely on grounds not
available under the FAA or common law. Bowen, 254 F.3d at 937 n.8. This issue will not be addressed by this note.
14. Arguments for the expansion ofjudicial review do note that there is a possibility of creating another tier
in the judicial process; that is, there is a possibility that it might create an informal step in the judicial process,
allowing for arbitration first, then the judicial process. See generally, Rau, supra note 6, at 261.
15. See generally Ware, supra note 6. "Opt-in" review allows parties to opt-in for expanded review under
the Revised Uniform Arbitration Act (RUAA). Id. at 263. Opt-in review under RUAA is limited to the review
allowed under the statute. Id. Thus, if the statute allows parties to an arbitration agreement to "opt-in" for review
of errors of law under a de novo standard, they cannot opt-in for review of factual errors under the same standard.
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But the Tenth Circuit did not stop there. Instead, the court also analyzed this issue
under a second rationale: expansion of judicial review by contract is contrary to the
policies of the FAA. 6 This argument seems no less reasonable than the decisions of
the Fifth and the Ninth Circuits allowing for expansion of judicial review by
contract.' 7 Neither the FAA, nor its policy of enforcing agreements to arbitrate,
expressly allows or disallows the use of privately expanding judicial review. In fact,
the holding of the Tenth Circuit that expansion of judicial review does violence to
the policies of the FAA may have deleterious implications on state courts that wish
to allow parties to "opt-in" for some expanded review. 8 Because the FAA preempts
state laws that do "violence to the policies of the FAA," the Tenth Circuit's holding
would preempt state legislators from allowing private parties to expand judicial
review.' 9
As was stated earlier, this note will not add much to the debate on whether
expansion of judicial review will increase or decrease the use of arbitration. Instead,
this note will focus on the effects of the Tenth Circuit's differing rationales and the
implications of the Bowen decision on state courts. This note will give a brief
statement of the case; some background on arbitration, including its history, the
FAA, and the reason for its promulgation; and case precedent that has analyzed the
FAA. This note will also analyze the case and discuss the implications of the
decision.
II. STATEMENT OF THE CASE
In this case, the Bowens initially brought suit in federal district court against
Amoco Pipeline Company (Amoco) for damages relating to a leaking oil pipeline
that was owned by Amoco and ran through the Bowens' property.2 ° Amoco sought
to compel arbitration2' based on an arbitration clause in the easement agreement
upon which the oil pipeline burdened the Bowens' property.22 The district court
granted Amoco's motion and entered an order compelling arbitration between
Amoco and the Bowens.23
In August of 1999, the case was arbitrated before a panel that adopted the Rules
for Non-Administered Arbitration of Business Disputes (NABD) with some

Id.
16. Bowen, 254 F.3d at 934-36.

17. Id. at 934-35.
18. Id. at 935 ("Contract clause in this case threatens to undermine the policies behind the FAA.")
19. The court in Bowen is not clear on whether expanded judicial review in general is against the policies
of the FAA or if privately created standards are against the policies of the FAA. See id. at 934-36. The bulk of this
note attempts to determine this issue.
20. Id. at 927-30.
21. Id. at 929. Under 9 U.S.C. § 2 (1994), an agreement to arbitrate "an existing controversy arising out of
such contract, transaction, or refusal, shall be valid, irrevocable, and enforceable, save upon such grounds as exist
at law or in equity for the revocation of any contract." The Supreme Court has iterated that, "by its terms, the
[Federal Arbitration] Act leaves no place for the exercise of discretion by a district court, but instead mandates that
district courts shall direct the parties to proceed to arbitration on issues as to which an arbitration agreement has
been signed." Dean Witter Reynolds v. Byrd, 470 U.S. 213, 218 (1985).
22. Bowen, 254 F.3d at 928 ("In 1918, the predecessors in interest of both parties entered into a right-of-way
agreement, which contained an arbitration provision. This agreement, which governed the grant of a pipeline
easement, was ratified by a second agreement.").
23. Id.
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modifications.24 The modifications, agreed upon by both parties, included a clause
stating that both parties "would have the right to appeal any arbitration award to the
district court within thirty days 'on the grounds that the award is not supported by
the evidence.' ' 25 On October 18, 1999, the arbitration panel granted the Bowens
partially on Amoco's "less than forthcoming approach to
substantial relief, 26 based
27
th[e] entire matter.,
The Bowens then filed a motion for confirmation of the arbitration award in
district court, pursuant to 9 U.S.C Section 9.28 Upon the filing of the confirmation,
Amoco filed an objection to the confirmation and then filed a motion requesting the
court to vacate the award. 29 Amoco also filed an appeal of the arbitration award with

24. Id. at 930.
25. Id.
26. Id. The relief was as follows: $3,032,000 to be used for the abatement of the contaminated property
caused by the leaking oil pipeline; $100,000 for the diminution of the Bowens' property value; $1,200,000 for
annoyance, inconvenience, and aggravation caused by Amoco's continual denial that they were the cause of the
problem and their attempts to hide certain data from the Bowens; $1,000,000 in punitive damages; and $41,000 for
the costs of investigation and mitigation.
27. Id. at 929 n.l.
28. Id. at 930. A court must confirm a pre-dispute arbitration award that the parties agree to be final and
binding unless it is procured by fraud, corruption, partiality, or other undue means. See below:
9 U.S.C. § 9 (1947) states, the court must confirm the award if
the parties in their agreement have agreed that a judgment of the court shall be entered upon the
award made pursuant to the arbitration, and shall specify the court, then at any time within one
year after the award is made any party to the arbitration may apply to the court so specified for
an order confirming the award, and thereupon the court must grant such an order unless the
award is vacated, modified, or corrected as prescribed in sections 10 and 11 of this title.
Section 10 of the FAA states,
(a) In any of the following cases the United States court in and for the district wherein the award
was made may make an order vacating the award upon the application of any party to the
arbitration(1) Where the award was procured by corruption, fraud, or undue means.
(2) Where there was evident partiality or corruption in the arbitrators, or either of them
(3) Where the arbitrators were guilty of misconduct in refusing to postpone the hearing, upon
sufficient cause shown, or in refusing to hear evidence pertinent and material to the controversy;
or of any other misbehavior by which the rights of any party have been prejudiced.
(4) Where the arbitrators exceeded their powers, or so imperfectly executed them that a
mutual, final, and definite award upon the subject matter submitted was not made
(5) Where an award is vacated and the time within which the agreement required the award
to be made has not expired the court may, in its discretion, direct a rehearing by the arbitrators.
(b) The United States district court for the district wherein an award that was issued made
pursuant to section 580 of title 5 may make an order vacating the award upon the application of
a person, other than a party to the arbitration, who is adversely affected or aggrieved by the
award, if the use of arbitration or the award is clearly inconsistent with the factors set forth in
section 572 of title 5.
Section II of the FAA states,
In either of the following cases the United States court in and for the district wherein the award
was made may make an order modifying or correcting the award upon the application of any
party to the arbitration(a) where there was an evident material miscalculation of figures or an evident material mistake
in the description of any person, thing, or property referred to in the award.
(b) Where the arbitrators have awarded upon a matter not submitted to them, unless it is a matter
not affecting the merits of the decision upon the matter submitted.
(c)Where the award is imperfect in matter of form not affecting the merits of the controversy.
The order may modify and correct the award, so as to effect the intent thereof and promote
justice between the parties.
29. Bowen, 254 F.3d at 930.
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the district court pursuant to the modified arbitration rules agreed upon by Amoco
and the Bowens.3"
The district court refused to apply the modified standard of review agreed upon
by the parties in the arbitration agreement.3 Instead, the district court limited its
review to the standards set out in 9 U.S.C Section 10 of the FAA.32 Using the FAA
standard, the court refused to vacate the award, granting the Bowens their motion
to confirm the award.33 Amoco appealed the district court's order, asking the Tenth
Circuit Court of Appeals to vacate the award and remand for a new arbitration or to
vacate the remediation award and remand the case for review based on the modified
standard of review agreed upon between the parties. 4 The Bowens sought to dismiss
Amoco's appeal for lack of appellate jurisdiction. The Tenth Circuit found that they
had appellate jurisdiction 35 and upheld the district court's decision to limit the
review to the FAA's standard.36
Im BACKGROUND
Arbitration has become a popular dispute resolution tool. With this widespread
use of arbitration has come court acceptance of arbitration as a legitimate means of
resolving disputes.37 In fact, the Supreme Court has held that arbitration is just
another forum to settle disputes and so long as a party's substantive rights are
enforced, arbitration is an adequate forum to settle substantive issues. Though the
Supreme Court has shed its judicial hostility of arbitration, there are differences
between the two forums. In fact, the very things that make arbitration and
adjudication different are the reasons why arbitration is less expensive than
litigation. 39 Given that, it is important to understand these distinctions in order to
determine the purposes and goals of the two forums. This background section will
give a brief discussion of the differences between arbitration and litigation, give the
history of arbitration and the inception of the FAA, and discuss relevant case
precedent relating to the issue of privately expanding judicial review.

30. Id.
31. Id.
32. Id. See also supra note 28 (listing each subsection of 9 U.S.C. § 10 (1994)).
33. Bowen, 254 F.3d at 930.
34. Id. The remediation award was the cost of abatement of the contaminated property, which was
$3,032,000. ld.
35. id. at 930-31. The court summarily dismissed this issue, arguing that the clause stating that the district
courts ruling "shall be final" was merely a finality clause conferring jurisdiction on the district court to confirm the
award, which is required under 9 U.S.C § 9. Id. See also Erika Van Ausdall, Confirmation ofArbitralAwards: The
Confusion Surrounding Section 9 ofthe FederalArbitrationAct, 49 DRAKE L. REV. 41 (2000) (stating that agreeing
to arbitrate is insufficient to establish that the arbitration award shall be final and binding under the FAA, but
evidence that the arbitration award would be final and binding should suffice). The court further stated that the
language in the arbitration agreement attempting to limit the amount of review to the district court level was too
ambiguous and therefore the amount of review would not be limited in this case. Bowen, 254 F.3d at 931. The
language in this case indicates that the court would be willing to limit review to the district court level if the
language was clearer as to that purpose. Id. The court gave no guidance as to how the clause should be worded. Id.
36. Bowen, 254 F.3d at 930-38.
37. See Rodriguez De Quijas v. Shearson/Am. Express, Inc., 490 U.S. 477, 480 (1989) (noting the Court's
"current strong endorsement of the federal statutes favoring this method of resolving disputes").
38.' Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20 (1991).
39. See generally David S. Schwartz, Enforcing Small Print to Protect Big Business: Employee and
Consumer Rights Claims in an Age of Compelled Arbitration, 1997 Wis. L. REV. 33 (1997).
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A. Arbitration versus Litigation

Arbitration is a private form of dispute resolution agreed upon by the parties to
the dispute.' Typically, arbitration is similar to civil litigation, except that
arbitration tends to be more streamlined, with less discovery and more relaxed
evidentiary and formal rules than court proceedings.4 Arbitration is a creature of
contract, and, therefore, parties are not bound to arbitration unless the parties agree
to it.42 Parties to an arbitration agreement may agree to any number of different
procedures and rules to govern the proceeding, including choosing the arbitrator,
based on their needs.43 Thus, arbitration typically makes for a more efficient and
speedy resolution of the dispute relative to litigation." Equally, because of its
efficiency, private parties concerned about the costs of litigation will choose this
forum over the courts. This is beneficial to the courts and the public in general
because it reduces the burden on the courts.45
Besides arbitration being more efficient and informal than litigation, there is also
a difference in how an arbitrator is allowed to make a decision relative to that of a
judge. Typically, the arbitrator is allowed to use his experience to determine the case
based on "industry custom, rough justice, over all equity, and their gut reactions to
the dispute. 46 A judge, on the other hand, is required to follow "legal logic"; that
is, judges must follow set principles and procedures established by common law and
statutes.47 Thus, judges are not given as much freedom to follow their gut instincts
or to do what they feel is just. Equally, because arbitrators use more creative
methods to decide issues, they are generally not required to justify their findings
through a written decision;48 thus, parties to an arbitration agreement may not know
the arbitrator's reason for the decision. Also, arbitrators are not constrained by the
rules and ethics of the bar and have very limited oversight of any ethical standards.49
Given that arbitrators do not have to substantiate their decision through a written

40. Stephen J. Ware, Default Rules from Mandatory Rules: Privatizing Law through Arbitration, 88 MINN.
L. REV. 703, 708-09 (1999).
41. See Jeffrey W. Stempel, Pitfalls of Public Policy: The Case of Arbitration Agreements, 22 ST. MARY'S
L.J. 259, 265 (1990).
42. See Ware, supra note 40, at 709.
43. See Stempel, supra note 41, at 264-71; see also Edward Brunet & Walter E. Stem, Drafting the Effective
ADR Clause for Natural Resources and Energy Contracts, 1 I NAT. RESOURCES & ENV'T 7 (1996) (noting that
"arbitrators must follow the written directives of the disputants and courts tend to rely on the written intent of the
parties").
44. Sabin, supra note 1, at 1359.
45. Id. (noting that arbitration is efficient, but also stating that there is debate as to whether arbitration is
actually more efficient for the courts and the parties involved).
46. Id. Of course, parties to an arbitration agreement can limit the amount of "rough justice" that an arbitrator
can use by stipulating such in the contract. The issue is whether the courts will require the arbitrator to strictly
adhere to the contractual terms. See Ware, supra note 40, at 711 (noting that "an agreement to arbitrate is, in effect,
an agreement to comply with the arbitrator's decision whether or not the arbitrator applies the law"); see also Major
League Baseball Players Assoc. v. Steve Garvey, 121 S. Ct. 1724, 1728 (2001) (stating that "if an arbitrator is even
arguably construing the law or applying the contract and acting within the scope of his authority, the fact that a court
is convinced he committed serious error does not suffice to overturn his decision").
47. See Stempel, supra note 41, at 267.
48. See Michael Hunter Schwartz, From Star to Supernova to Dark, Cold Neutron Star: The Early Life, the
Explosion and the Collapse of Arbitration 22 W. ST. U. L. REV. 1, 17 (1994).
49. See Sabin, supra note I, at 1354.
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opinion and they are not constrained by any ethical standards, arbitrators not only
have more freedom in the decision-making process relative to a judge, they also
have more unrestrained power in the process as well. 50
Though the arbitral process is a speedy and cost-effective resolution tool, those
things that make it that way are the very things that parties seek to redress through
litigation, namely the quality of the decision.5 Because of the relaxed rules of
evidence, evidence that would not be admitted in a trial, such as hearsay evidence,
could be admitted in an arbitral proceeding. 52 Also, with the limited role discovery
plays in arbitration, the parties to the arbitral proceeding may be "left in the dark"
as to how to allocate resources and plan for the ensuing arbitration.53 Of course,
parties may contractually limit or increase the types and the formalities of any of the
rules and procedures they wish to incorporate into the arbitral process. 54 These
changes naturally increase or decrease the cost of the arbitration process; thus, the
very things that make arbitration attractive, namely the efficiency and informality,
may impact the quality of the decision. 55 Therefore, by increasing the quality of the
decision, the value of arbitration as a dispute resolution procedure may actually
decrease.
Perhaps of greater significance than the differences and similarities between
arbitration and litigation are the reasons why the two forums exist in the first place.
Arbitration allows parties to look outside the issues and to shape and mold the
arbitral process in a way that may benefit the parties beyond that of the dispute
itself.56 Thus, parties might construct an arbitral proceeding for any number of
different reasons besides the issue that is before them, and it allows them to do it in
a private forum rather than a public forum like the courts. Litigation, on the other
hand, develops law through precedent and is imbedded with quality control
mechanisms that result in more finely tuned and accurate decisions. 57 Part of the
reason for these formalities and quality control mechanisms is because the judiciary
serves more than the interests of the private individual. 5' The courts develop laws
for the public when they make a ruling for the individuals involved in the dispute.59
This informs the public of the law and allows the public to act accordingly.'

50. Schwartz, supra note 48, at 16-17; see also, Sabin, supra note I, at 1341-44.
51. There is no data indicating that adjudication creates higher quality decisions than arbitration, though it
seems to make sense that the more formal procedures of a trial court, coupled with the review process, would create
more finely tuned decisions--or the image of quality. See Stempel, supra note 41, at 269; see also Schwartz, supra
note 48, at 16 (stating that there is no empirical data showing that arbitrators decide cases unjustly or unethically).
52. See Schwartz, supra note 48, at 18-19.
53. Id. at 14.
54. Dean Witter Reynolds Inc. v. Byrd, 470 U.S. 213, 221 (1985) (stating that the purpose of the FAA was
to enforce private agreements into which parties had entered).
55. See Schwartz, supra note 48, at 24 (noting that the deficiencies in arbitration stem from its inherent
benefits, most notably, its lower costs).
56. See Lon L. Fuller, The Forms and Limits ofAdjudication, 92 HARV. L. REV. 353, 394-96 (1978) (noting
that polycentric issues might be better resolved through arbitration rather than litigation).
57. See Ian Ayres & Robert Gertner, Filling Gaps in Incomplete Contracts: An Economic Theory of Default
Rules, 99 YALE L.J. 87, 124 (stating that "the evidentiary function of legal formalities is to provide information to
courts in order to lower the costs of subsequent decision making").
58. See Schwartz, supra note 48, at 21.
59. Id. This, of course, increases the costs of litigation. See Stempel, supra note 41, at 270,
60. See Fuller, supra note 56, at 366 ("[A]djudication is.. .a device which gives formal and institutional
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Equally, the rules and formalities of the courts constrain and limit the judge's power
in order to create the image of an unbiased court so that the individual who seeks
redress there feels that he/she has had his/her "day in court."61 The formalities of the
court both inform the public of the law and foster an image of integrity so that
parties will feel that they received justice and that the law is justified. 62 This, of
course, is different from arbitration, which seeks only to arbitrate for the parties to
the contract's claims. 63 An arbitrator is not worried about the development of
precedent or the public in general, but only in following the terms of a contract
agreed upon by private parties.'
Arbitration is an efficient method for resolving disputes, but with that efficiency
comes rules and procedures that are different from the judiciary. If the dispute is
over a small award of money damages, arbitration may be an adequate forum
because of the costs of litigation.65 But when the dispute is of major public concern,
or the remedy may be a large money damage claim, parties to the dispute may want
66
more formalities, and checks on the arbitrator, to protect their interests.
B. History of Arbitrationand Its Progeny in the United States
Arbitration is a form of dispute resolution with roots at least as deep as the British
Law Merchant. 67 "The Law Merchant was an outgrowth" of business disputes and
an attempt by commercial industry to settle disputes through their industries' custom
and/or trade. 68 The Law Merchant was originally an informal tribunal administered
and decided by non-lawyers. 69 Eventually, the Law Merchant ceased to exist as a
separate entity and cases formerly decided by this tribunal were adjudicated in the
Common Pleas, with the doctrines and principles of the Law Merchant effectively
becoming precedent for the courts.7" Upon the absorption of the Law Merchant into
the British Courts and the degradation of the speed, inexpensiveness, and
informality of the Law Merchant due to this incorporation, businessmen began to
develop another forum: arbitration.7 Initially, arbitration meant presenting a dispute
to a merchant, or group of merchants, and asking the merchant for an oral ruling on
the dispute.72 Because the courts had a monopoly on coercive remedies, if a
disputant failed to abide by the arbitrated decision, the other party's remedy was
adverse publicity and ostracism.73 Though parties to an arbitration agreement
theoretically had specific enforcement of the contract through the courts, merchants

expression."); see also Schwartz, supra note 48, at 21 (stating "precedent also guides behavior").
61. See Schwartz, supra note 48, at 21.
62. Id.
63. See Ware, supranote 6, at 745 ("[A]rbitrator's ruling only governs the parties to that particular dispute.").
64. Id.
65. See Schwartz, supra note 48, at 23.
66. See Younger, supra note 6, at 261-62 ("[l]f the primary concern is avoiding irrational results, the party
may be better off in conventional litigation.").
67. See Stempel, supra note 41, at 270-71.
68. Id.
69. Id.
70.

Id.

71. Id.
72. Id.
73. /d.
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who sought to specifically enforce arbitration agreements were met with hostility
from the British courts.74 The courts reasoned that such agreements were "against
public policy because they 'oust the jurisdiction' of the courts."75 Thus, parties to
an arbitration agreement had no coercive remedy to enforce the clause, save for the
informal methods mentioned.
Of course, the party who breached an arbitration agreement had some reason for
their action, and there were a number of reasons why a party might want to breach
an arbitration agreement.7 6 If the informal costs of market punishment were minimal,
a party to an arbitration agreement might breach when they had "a better legal
position than commercial position; wanted a jury trial; distrusted the arbitratoror
organization and wanted appellate review; sought consequential and exemplary
damages, which were commonly thought to be more freely and generously awarded
by courts; or when both their legal and commercial positions were untenable and
they desired to delay the inevitable loss."77 Inevitably, under the right circumstances,
a party to an arbitration agreement would breach the contract knowing full well that
the agreement would not be enforced and they would not suffer any substantial
damage to their reputation.78
In the nineteenth century, the U.S. courts adopted the English courts' hostility to
arbitration, refusing to specifically enforce arbitration agreements, or to stay a
proceeding on the original cause of action.79 Because businessmen had no effective
remedy due to the adoption of the English courts' judicial hostility, Congress
adopted the Federal Arbitration Act in 1925, which mandated that agreements to
arbitrate be specifically enforced by the federal courts.'0 The legislative history
states that the purpose of the FAA was to eliminate the judicial hostility adopted by
the U.S. courts from the English courts a few centuries prior.8 As a House Report
indicates, the need for the FAA arose because of an
anachronism of our American Law. Some centuries ago, because of the jealousy
of the English courts for their own jurisdiction, they refused to enforce specific
agreements to arbitrate upon the ground that the courts were thereby ousted from
their jurisdiction. This jealousy survived for so long a period that the principle
became firmly embedded in the English common law and was adopted with it
by the American courts.8 2

74. Id. at 272.
75. Id. See also Kulukundis Shipping Co. v. Amtorg Trading Corp., 126 F.2d 978, 983 (2d Cir. 1942)
(noting that judges were paid fees to settle cases and therefore they may have wanted to keep control of jurisdiction
and profit). There were other justifications for not specifically performing the contract. Some English courts
reasoned that they were agents for each principal to the contract and that either principal could ask the court for
relief in court. Schwartz, supra note 39, at 74. The courts also used remedial measures to not enforce the contract,
reasoning that specific performance of a contract was an extraordinary measure under contract and measuring
damages for breach was too difficult. Id.
76. Stempel, supra note 41, at 276.
77. Id. (emphasis added).
78. Stempel, supra note 41, at 277.
79. Kulukundis Shipping Co., 126 F.2d at 984.
80. Id. at 985.
81. Id.
82. Id.
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Congress created the FAA to place arbitration agreements on the "same footing
as other contracts, where it belongs" so that "such agreements for arbitration shall
be enforced and provide[] a procedure in Federal courts for their enforcement."83 In
establishing the FAA, Congress recognized that the expense and delay of litigation
could be eliminated "if arbitration agreements are made valid and enforceable."
The FAA grants an aggrieved party to an arbitration clause certain specific
remedies to enforce the agreement.8 5 The FAA gives parties who contract for
arbitration in "a contract evidencing a transaction involving commerce" the power
to enforce the contract in a court of law. 6 If a party to an arbitration agreement
refuses to arbitrate the claim, the aggrieved party may petition any U.S. district court
"for an order directing that such arbitration proceed in the manner provided for in
such agreement."" Also, the FAA allows a party involved in a judicial proceeding
who has an issue that may be referable to arbitration to stay the judicial proceeding
until the issue is resolved through arbitration.88
Limiting judicial control of the arbitral process further enhances this enforcement
power.89 The courts must enforce the arbitration agreement "save upon such grounds
as exist at law or in equity for the revocation of any contract."9 Once an arbitration
panel grants an award, the court must enter a judgment on the award "unless the
award is vacated, modified or corrected."'" Though the court may vacate the award,
it may only do so if it was procured by fraud, where there was evident partiality or
corruption by the arbitrator, arbitrator misconduct, or the arbitrator exceeded his
powers.92 The courts may only modify or correct the award when there is an evident
miscalculation of the figures or a mistake as to the thing referred to in the award.93
Thus, courts' review of arbitration awards is extremely narrow under the FAA.
C. Relevant Case Precedent on the FAA
The Supreme Court has stated, "[the] passage of the [Federal Arbitration] Act was
motivated, first and foremost, by a congressional desire to enforce agreements into
which parties had entered, and we must not overlook this principal objective when
construing this statute."'94 Thus, the Supreme Court has held that there is a "federal
policy favoring arbitration" and issues as to the enforcement of an arbitration clause

83. Id.
84. Kulukundis, 126 F.2d at 985.
85. See generally 9 U.S.C. §§ 2-11 (1994).
86. 9 U.S.C. § 2 states,

A written provision in any maritime transaction or a contract evidencing a transaction involving
commerce to settle by arbitration a controversy thereafter arising out of such contract or

transaction, or the refusal to perform the whole or any part thereof, or an agreement in writing
to submit to arbitration an existing controversy arising out of such a contract, transaction, or
refusal, shall be valid, irrevocable, and enforceable, save upon such grounds as exist at law or
in equity for the revocation of any contract.
87. 9 U.S.C. § 4 (1994).

88. 9 U.S.C. § 3 (1994).
89. See Rau, supra note 6, at 230-32.
90. 9 U.S.C. § 2 (1994).

91. 9 U.S.C. § 9 (1994).
92. 9 U.S.C. § 10 (1994).
93. 9 U.S.C. § 11 (1994).

94. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc. v. Byrd, 470 U.S. 213, 220 (1985).
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are "resolved in favor of arbitration."95 ITis policy favoring arbitration has led the
Supreme Court to expressly uphold the enforcement of arbitration agreements for
claims under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act 6 and the Racketeer
Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act.97 The Supreme Court has further upheld
°°
arbitration agreements for securities acts," s anti-trust," and labor dispute claims.
Though the Supreme Court has not expressly ruled on whether or not it should
expand the scope of judicial review of arbitration awards by contract, it has stated
that the court must "rigorously enforce agreements according to their terms,"'' 1
above and beyond the policy concerns of efficient and speedy resolution of the
claim. 102 Yet the Court has also stated that arbitration agreements are as enforceable
as other contracts, "but not more so."' 3
One Supreme Court decision that has defined the contractual nature of arbitration
agreements is Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc. v. Byrd." The Court in Byrd explicitly
stated that agreements to arbitrate should be rigorously enforced, even above the
concerns of efficiency and informality, the battle cries for arbitration generally.0 5
In Byrd, one party to the arbitration agreement wished to stay the arbitral claims
until other claims were resolved in court."° The Supreme Court found that claims
that are arbitrable under the FAA should be arbitrated under the terms of the
agreement.'0 7 The Court stated that sections three and four of the FAA leave the
courts no room to exercise discretion but instead mandate that the court direct the
parties to "proceed to arbitration on issues as to which an arbitration agreement has
been signed."' 8 The Court reasoned that
The legislative history of the (FAA] establishes that the purpose behind its
passage was to ensure judicial enforcement of privately made agreements to
arbitrate. [The Supreme Court] therefore reject[s] the suggestion that the
overriding goal of the Arbitration Act was to promote the expeditious resolution
of claims ....
The House Report accompanying the Act makes clear that its
purpose was to place an arbitrationagreement 'upon the samefooting as other
contracts,where it belongs,' and to overrulethe judiciary'slongstandingrefusal
to enforce agreements to arbitrate."9
The Court recognized that the purpose of the FAA was to shed judicial hostility
0 Thus,
and to protect the contractual bargain of the parties, but nothing more.°"
the

95.
96.
97.
98.
99.
100.
101.
102.
103.
104.
105.
106.
107.
108.
109.
110.

Volt Info. Sci., Inc. v. Board of Trustees of the Leland Stanford Jr. Univ., 489 U.S 468, 476 (1989).
See Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20 (1991).
See Shearson/Am. Express, Inc. v. McMahon, 482 U.S. 220 (1987).
See id.; see also Rodriguez De Quijas v. Shearson Am. Express, Inc., 490 U.S. 477 (1989).
Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614 (1985).
Circuit City Stores, Inc. v. Adams, 121 S.Ct. 1302 (2001).
Volt, 489 U.S. at 479.
Byrd, 470 U.S. at 221.
Prima Paint Corp. v. Flood & Conklin Mfg. Co., 388 U.S. 395, 404 n.12 (1967).
470 U.S. 213 (1985).
Id.
at218.
Id.
at215.
Id.
at 217.
Id.
at 218.
Id. at 219 (quoting H.R. Rep. No. 96, 68th Cong., 1st Sess., 1 (1924) (emphasis added)).
Id. at 217-21. See also Prima Paint Corp., 388 U.S. at 404 n. 12.
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Court found that the FAA does not allow the court to determine the parties' wisdom
to decide to arbitrate some of the issues, but must protect the contract rights of the
parties."'
In a similar case, Volt Information Sciences, Inc. v. Board of Trustees of Leland
Stanford Junior University,"2 the Supreme Court found that parties may submit
themselves to state arbitration laws if those laws do not "do[] violence to the policies
behind the FAA.""' 3 Though the agreement in Volt required that the arbitration be
stayed until after certain issues were litigated, the Court reasoned that the FAA has
"no express pre-emptive provision nor does it reflect a congressional intent to
occupy the entire field of arbitration," therefore "parties are generally free to
structure their arbitration agreements as they see fit. Just as they may limit by
contract the issues which they will arbitrate... so too may they specify by contract
the rules under which that arbitration will be conducted.""' 4 The Court allowed the
parties to stay arbitration because of the principal purpose of the FAA, which is "to
115
ensure that private arbitration agreements are enforced according to their terms."
From this Supreme Court precedent, and the policies articulated by other Supreme
Court cases," 6 some circuits have allowed for the expansion of judicial review by
private contract. 117
The Fifth Circuit was the first federal appellate court to decide that parties to an
arbitration agreement may expand the scope of judicial review." 8 In this case MCI
Telecommunications Corporation (MCI) breached a contract with Gateway
Technologies, Inc. (Gateway).' Prior to the dispute, the parties agreed to binding
arbitration, inserting a clause in the agreement stating "that errors of law shall be
subject to appeal."' 2 The parties went to arbitration and Gateway was awarded
actual and punitive damages in an arbitration award.' MCI challenged the award
and the district court reviewed the award under a harmless error standard, "but with
due regard for the federal policy favoring arbitration," instead of reviewing the
award de novo, which is the typical standard of review a court would use for errors
of law. 2 2 The Fifth Circuit reversed this holding and instead held that the parties
contracted for appellate review, and because the standard that a court must apply in
reviewing the trial court would be de novo, the court must review the arbitration

111. Byrd, 470 U.S. at 221; see also First Options of Chicago, Inc. v. Kaplan, 514 U.S. 938, 947 (1995)
(citing Byrd, 470 U.S. at 221, for the proposition that the objective of the FAA was "not to resolve disputes in the
quickest manner possible").
112. 489 U.S. 468 (1989).
113. Id. at 479.
114.
115.

Id.
Id.

116. See, e.g., Gateway Techs., Inc. v. MCI Telecomms. Corp., 64 F.3d 993 (5th Cir. 1995) (citing First
Options of Chicago v. Kaplan, 514 U.S. 938 (1995); Allied-Bruce Terminix Companies, Inc. v. Dobson, 513 U.S.
265 (1995); Shearson/American Express, Inc. v. McMahon, 482 U.S. 220 (1987); Mastrobuono v. Shearson Lehman
Hutton, Inc., 542 U.S. 52 (1995)).
117. See, e.g., id.; La Pine Tech. Corp. v. Kyocera Corp., 130 F.3d 884 (9th Cir. 1997).
118. Gateway, 64 F.3d 993.
119. ld. at 996.
120. Id. at 995.
121. Id.
122. Id. at 996.
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award under a de novo standard. 123 The court reasoned that the "FAA's proarbitration policy does not operate without regard to the wishes of the contracting
parties."' 24 Because of this policy, they were required to interpret the clause as the
parties requested, otherwise it would "frustrate the mutual intent of the parties" and
would be contrary to the edict established by the Supreme Court that agreements to
arbitrate be upheld, according to their terms. 2 ' For this reason, the court found that
"federal arbitration policy demands that
the court conduct its review according to
1' 26
the terms of the arbitration contract.
The Ninth Circuit followed suit, similarly determining that the Supreme Court has
established a policy in favor of arbitration and that the court must enforce arbitration
agreements that expand the scope of judicial review.' 27 The court further added that
the expansion of review by private parties to an arbitration agreement "is far less
searching and time-consuming inquiry than a full trial." 28 The court recognized that
"agreeing to the scope of review by a court is not the same as agreeing to the scope
of the arbitration itself;" therefore, there was no reason to "pay less respect to the
review provision than we pay to the myriad of other agreements which the parties
have been pleased to make."' 29 Thus, the court found that expansion of judicial
review was within the purview of the FAA. 3 °
Though the Fifth and Ninth Circuits have determined that the expansion of
judicial review by contract is within the purview of the FAA, others do not agree
with their holding.13' In Chicago Typographical Union v. Chicago Sun-Times,
Justice Posner stated,
an agreement to submit a dispute over the interpretation of a labor or other
contract to arbitration is a contractual commitment to abide by the arbitrator's
interpretation. If the parties want, they can contract for an appellate arbitration
panel to review the arbitrator's award. But they cannot contract for judicial
review of that award; federal jurisdiction cannot be created by contract.32
Equally, Mayer's dissent in La Pine stated, "Kyocera cites no authority explicitly
empowering litigants to dictate how an Article LI court must review an arbitration
decision. Absent this they may not."' 33 Even a concurring opinion in the La Pine
decision stressed that the decision to expand judicial review was "closer than
most.' 34 Judge Kozinski stated that the Supreme Court decisions are "helpful," but
the pro-arbitration policy announced by the Court cannot be the only justification. 31

123. Id. at 997.
124. Id. at 996.
125. Id. at 997.
126. Id.
127. La Pine, 130 F.3d at 887.
128. Id. at 889.
129. Id.
130. Id. at 890.
131. Chicago Typographical Union v. Chicago Sun-Times, Inc., 935 F.2d 1501 (7th Cir. 1991); La Pine, 130
F.3d at 891, (Mayer, J., dissenting).
132. Chicago Typographical,935 F.2d at 1505. For an interesting discussion on the jurisdictional issue, see
Di Jiang-Schuerger, Note, Perfect Arbitration= Arbitration + Litigation?4 HARV. NEGOT. L. REV. 231 (1999).
133. La Pine, 130 F.3d at 891 (Mayer, J., dissenting).
134. Id. (Kozinski, J., concurring).
135. Id.
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Kozinski reasoned that because there was jurisdiction in the case,' 36 and since
enforcing an expanded judicial review clause in an arbitration agreement will
consume fewer court resources, the clause should be upheld. 37 Yet Kozinski did
state that Congress never authorized courts to review arbitral awards under standards
adopted by the parties and "[fin general, [he did] not believe parties may' impose
on
38
the federal courts burdens and functions that Congress ha[d] withheld."'
Though the decisions articulated in La Pine and Gateway depend on the proarbitration policy established by the Supreme Court, the Court has recently found
that pro-arbitration policies of the FAA do not allow parties to stretch the agreement
140
39
beyond general principles of contract theory. In EEOC v. Waffle House, Inc.,
the Court refused to compel arbitration between the EEOC and Waffle House, Inc.
(Waffle House) because the EEOC was not a party to the original arbitration
agreement.' 4' In this case, a Waffle House employee signed an arbitration agreement
when he was hired. 42 The arbitration agreement stipulated that "any dispute or claim
concerning [applicant's] employment [with Waffle House].. .will[] be settled by
binding arbitration."' 4 3 An employee filed an ADA claim with the EEOC, but never
sought arbitration or relief in court against Waffle House.'44 The EEOC brought an
action in federal district court against Waffle House, requesting that the employee
be made "whole."'' 45 Waffle House requested that the court compel arbitration,
which was denied at the district court level and granted at the appellate level. 146 The
Supreme Court reversed the appellate court's decision to compel arbitration, stating,
"it goes without saying that a contract cannot bind a nonparty. Accordingly, the pro
arbitration policy goals of the FAA do not require the agency to relinquish its
statutory authority if it has not agreed to do so.' 4 Thus, the Supreme Court refused
to extend the FAA beyond the reach of common law contract theory.
Though the Tenth Circuit stands alone in its decision not to enforce a privately
expanded judicial review of an arbitration award, there are legitimate reasons for not
enforcing such contractual provisions. The Tenth Circuit's rationale for its decision
will be discussed next, followed by an analysis of that decision.
IV. RATIONALE
The Tenth Circuit disagreed with the rationale of the Fifth and Ninth Circuits.'48
Though the court recognized that the Supreme Court has made it abundantly clear
that the FAA was designed for the primary purpose of ensuring judicial enforcement

136. Id. at 891 (noting that "any case properly in district court under the [FAA] must have an independent
jurisdictional basis").
137. Id.
138. Id.
139. EEOC v. Waffle House, Inc., 122 S. Ct. 754 (2002).
140. Id.
141. Id. at 758.
142. Id.
143. Id.
144. Id.
145. Id. at 758.
146. Id. at 762-63.
147. Id. at 764.
148. Bowen, 254 F.3d at 934 ("We disagree, however, with the Fifth and Ninth Circuits' conclusion.").
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of private agreements, the court refused to accept the circuit court's conclusions that
this ultimately requires that courts must enforce private, contractually modified,
judicial review.'49 The Tenth Circuit concluded, "the purposes behind the FAA, as
well as the principles announced in various Supreme Cases, do not support a ruling
allowing parties to alter the judicial process by private contract."'"5 The Tenth
Circuit used two rationales to come to this conclusion. 5' The first justification given
by the court was based on the idea that parties cannot dictate how the courts should
run their affairs.' The Tenth Circuit also reasoned that the expansion of judicial
review was contrary to the FAA's pro-arbitration policy because they "clearly
threaten to undermine the independence of the arbitration process and dilute the
finality of arbitration awards."
In coming to this conclusion, the Tenth Circuit first determined that the FAA's
primary purpose of enforcing agreements to arbitrate does not require that courts
enforce private agreements that modify judicial review.'"" The Tenth Circuit
analyzed Supreme Court cases that dealt with arbitration and the FAA and
determined that those cases emphasize that parties may specify by contract the rules
that will govern the arbitration proceedings, but they have never stated that parties
are free to interfere with the judicial process. 55 The Tenth Circuit then looked at the
specific language of the FAA and determined that "Congress has provided explicit
guidance" regarding the type of judicial review of arbitration awards 5 6 and that
parties may contract for an appellate arbitration panel if they want.'57 Though the
Tenth Circuit touched on the issue of whether or not private parties could create
federal jurisdiction by private contract, the Tenth Circuit explicitly chose not to
analyze this case under that argument.158 Instead, the court chose to hold that, "in the
absence of clear authority to the contrary, parties may not interfere with the judicial
process by dictating how the federal courts operate."' 59 In the end, the Tenth Circuit
found that the decisions of the Supreme Court "directing courts to honor parties'
agreements and to resolve close questions in favor of arbitration simply do not
dictate that courts submit to varying standards of review imposed by private
contract."'' 60 From these findings, the court found that neither the FAA nor Supreme
Court cases required courts to analyze arbitration awards under privately modified
standards and therefore the court was under no obligation to do so.'6'

149. Bowen, 254 F.3d at 934.
150. Id. at 933.
151. Id. at 934-37.
152. Id. at 934.
153. Id.
at 935.
154. Id. at 934.
155. Id. See also id. at 937 n.8 ("Because we hold that, in the absence of clear authority to the otherwise,
parties may not interfere with the judicial process by dictating how the federal courts operate, we need not decide
whether contractually created standards impermissibly attempt to create federal jurisdiction.").
156. See9U.S.C.§§ 10-11.
157. ld.
158. Bowen, 254 F.3d at 937 n.8.
159. Id.
160. Id. at 934.
161. Id.
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After the Tenth Circuit determined that there was no Supreme Court precedent
allowing for varying standards of review by private contract, the court then analyzed
the case under the rule adopted by the Supreme Court in Volt Information Sciences,
Inc.v. Board of Trustees of Leland Stanford Junior University.'62 The Tenth Circuit
reasoned that if private expansion of judicial review does "violence to the policies
behind the... FAA," then courts cannot allow for judicial expansion.163 First, the
court determined that the standard of review set out in the FAA is more than a set
of default rules"s that parties may alter with discretion. 65 The court then argued that
if Section 10 is not a default rule, the court must determine if the alternate rule,
expansion of judicial review, conflicts with the rules in the FAA.'66
The court then analyzed the effects of expanding judicial review by private
contract and concluded that this type of agreement would "undermine the policies
behind the FAA."' 67 The Tenth Circuit looked at the FAA, Supreme Court cases,
and the purpose and function of arbitration to determine that Congress intended that
arbitration under the FAA be separate and distinct from the judicial process.168 First,
the Tenth Circuit reasoned that the FAA's limited review "ensures judicial respect
for the arbitration process" and "manifest[s] a legislative intent to further the federal
policy favoring arbitration by preserving the independence of the arbitration
process."' 69 The court denied that Sections 10 and 11 of the FAA are default
standards, able to be changed by the parties. 170 The court argued that, unlike Section
4 of the FAA, which requires the federal court to compel arbitration in the manier
provided for in the agreement, Sections 10 and 11 do not contain language requiring
the district court to follow parties' agreements.' 7 ' This, the Tenth Circuit argued,
72
indicates a congressional intent to keep arbitration and adjudication separate.1
The Tenth Circuit then reviewed Supreme Court cases and determined that they
reflect the Court's view that arbitration and judicial review should be kept
separate, 17 The Tenth Circuit reasoned that a party "trades the procedures and
opportunity for review of the courtroom for the simplicity, informality, and
expedition of arbitration. ' 74 The Tenth Circuit argued that the distinction between
litigation and arbitration would be eroded if the courts were required to not only
enforce the agreement to arbitrate, but also the resulting arbitration. 175 Though the
Tenth Circuit's reasoning is not very clear on this point, the court seems to imply
that the Supreme Court has recognized that the two types of dispute resolution are

162.
163.
164.
contractual
165.
166.
167.
168.

489 U.S. 468 (1989).
Bowen, 254 F.3d at 934 (citing Volt, 489 U.S. at 479).
See Gateway, 64 F.3d at 997 ("Because these parties contractually agreed to expand judicial review, their
provision supplements the FAA's default standard of review.").
Bowen, 254 F.3d at 934-35 (citing Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1, 10 (1984)).
Id.

Id.
Id. at 935-36.

169. Id.at 935.
170.
171.
172.
173.
174.
175.

Id.
Id.

Id.
Id.
Bowen, 254 F.3d at 935 (quoting Gilmer, 500 U.S. at 31).
Id.
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distinct: one is informal and efficient, the other formal and more scrutinizing."
Thus, the Tenth Circuit argued, parties who contracted for expanded review would
create a new step in the arbitration process that would undermine the informality and
efficiency of the arbitration process and further erode the independence of
arbitration and adjudication.'77
The court also noted that expanded judicial review would put the courts in an
awkward position of reviewing proceedings under potentially unfamiliar rules and
procedures and reduce arbitrators' willingness to create particularized solutions.'7 8
The Tenth Circuit reasoned that arbitration is a different creature from litigation and
that appellate courts, which review lower courts' decisions and are constrained by
procedural rules and legal principles, are not equipped to review arbitration awards
that may be granted under different standards.'79 Because of these differences
between arbitration and litigation, the Tenth Circuit further argued that "specialized"
arbitrators, who would typically fashion creative arbitral awards, would be unwilling
to fashion creative remedies, fearful of vacation by the reviewing court. 8 Thus,
expanded review by private contract would further threaten the independence of
arbitration and litigation and "weaken the distinction between arbitration and
adjudication."''
These two justifications, though coming to the same conclusion that parties may
not contractually expand judicial review, are wholly different analyses of the reasons
why the court should not allow for expansion of judicial review and could have
implications that are not readily apparent from the decision. An analysis and the
implications of this decision will be discussed next.
V. ANALYSIS
The Tenth Circuit's two arguments, though coming to the same conclusion of
barring judicial review by contract, are not based on the same policy arguments. The
first argument, that parties to an arbitration agreement cannot dictate how a court
will review an arbitration decision, analyzes the effects of private contractual
expansion on the judiciary.'82 The second argument, that one of the FAA's policies
is to ensure that the independence of arbitration and adjudication, is not aimed at
protecting the independence of the courts directly, but is an attempt to establish
policy on the functions and purposes of arbitration and how Congress wished this
function and purpose to be enforced by the statute.'83 These distinctions are
important because one argument limits the way a party may affect the courts, the
176. Id.
177. Id. The court also analyzes Supreme Court decisions reviewing arbitration agreements controlled under
different statutes. id. at 935 n.5. The Tenth Circuit found that the Supreme Court's role in reviewing arbitrators'
awards is not the same as an appellate court reviewing decisions of lower courts. See id.at n.5 (citing United
Paperworkers Int'l Union, AFL-CIO v. Misco, Inc., 484 U.S. 29, 37-38 (1987)).
178. Id. at 935-36.
179. Id. at 936.
180. Id.
181. Id. The court did recognize that even a hybrid of arbitration that allowed for expanded review would be
more efficient than a full-blown trial. See id. at 936, n.6 (noting "that even under expanded standards of review,
arbitration reduces the burden on district courts").
182. Bowen, 254 F.3d at 933-35.
183. Id. at 934-36.
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other sets policy limits on the FAA itself.' Thus, an argument that parties may not
dictate to the courts how to review an award will reflect the harms to the court and
its processes, while the argument that expanded review does violence to the proarbitration policy of the FAA reflects the affects on arbitration through this
expansion. This means that the former argument will be tailored towards the undue
harms on the court itself, and so long as the Supreme Court, or legislators, do not
mandate that the lower courts must expand judicial review, this argument upholds
the integrity of the court and its formality. Yet the latter argument must be tailored
to show that the FAA specifically sought to limit the expansion of judicial review
through the legislature and the FAA itself.'85 This argument is a hard row because
there is no explicit legislative history or statute that expressly denounces, or allows,
expansion of judicial review.8 6 Equally, Supreme Court precedent does not state
that the FAA and its policy would not allow for the expansion of judicial review. 187
Given this, the former argument of restricting intervention into the courts by private
contract seems the wiser argument while the latter argument seems less tenable.
A. The Policies of the FAA Do Not Mandate Expansion ofJudicialReview by
Private Contract
The Tenth Circuit correctly determined that neither the Supreme Court nor the
FAA explicitly allows the expansion of judicial review by private contract.' The
Court in Byrd recognized that the purpose of the FAA was to eliminate judicial
hostility toward arbitration by requiring the courts to enforce those agreements like
a contract, but not more so. 8 9 The Supreme Court never explicitly states that parties
may encroach upon the judiciary. In fact, the Court explicitly recognizes legislative
history that states, "[the FAA] creates no new legislation, grants no new rights,
except a remedy to enforce an agreement" to arbitrate.' 9 There is no indication in
the legislative history of the FAA or Supreme Court cases that the FAA was
promulgated to give parties more power then they otherwise would have had they
not agreed to arbitration.' 9' The Byrd court clearly states that arbitration agreements
are to be treated as contracts to be specifically enforced, but not more so.' 92 If courts
allow for expanded review by private contract, parties to the agreement have the
power to control the standard of review of the arbitral award, a power that they
would not have had they decided to go to court directly.' 93 This seems to usurp

184. Id.
185. See Rau, supra note 6, at 231 (stating that the principal purpose of the FAA was to insulate parties from
judicial parochialism or intrusion).
186. See Gateway, 64 F.3d at 997 n.3 (noting that "the FAA does not prohibit parties who voluntarily agree
to arbitration from providing contractually for more expansive judicial review"). But see Bowen, 254 F.3d at 934
("No authority clearly allows private parties to determine how federal courts review arbitration awards.").
187. See Cullinan, supra note 6, at 421 (noting that Supreme Court precedent would allow for expansion of
judicial review). But see Curtin, supra note 6, at 78-79 (arguing that the Supreme Court allows parties to
contractually modify the procedures in arbitration, not the substantive law of the FAA).
188. Bowen, 254 F.3d at 934.
189. Byrd, 470 U.S. at 219-21.
190. Id. at 220 n.7 (citing 65 CONG. REC. 1931 (1924)).
191. Id.
192. Id. at 221.
193. If parties to an arbitration agreement decided to go to court, they could not ask the court to be bound by
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Congress's power to dictate to the courts the processes and procedures that the court
should use in the public interest.t" Thus, parties would have powers they would not
have had save for the fact that they agreed to binding arbitration.
Equally, the Court in Volt found that the judiciary must enforce agreements to
arbitrate, but "the FAA pre-empts state laws which 'require a judicial forum for the
resolution of claims which the contracting parties agreed to resolve by
arbitration.'""" Thus, the Court held that courts must enforce arbitration agreements
so long as those agreements do not do violence to the policy of "ensuring that
private arbitration agreements are enforced."'' 96 The Volt decision seems to imply
that agreements to arbitrate must be upheld above any rules adopted by the parties
that would nullify this federal policy favoring arbitration; that is, parties cannot
adopt rules and procedures that will completely abrogate the parties agreement to
arbitrate. In the case of expansion of judicial review by private contract, there is no
indication that by refusing to enforce expanded review by contract, arbitration
agreements will not be enforced or that the arbitration award itself will not be
enforced by the courts. On the contrary, it would seem that more arbitral awards
would be enforced ifjudicial standards articulated in the FAA do not become default
' 97
standards, because these standards are "among the narrowest known to the law"'
and courts rarely, if ever, overturn arbitral decisions.' 9" Thus, by following the
traditional standards, the court, arguably, could be furthering the policies of the
FAA. t99
Though the Supreme Court decided EEOC subsequent to this case, it seems that
the Court's trend is to limit the FAA's pro-arbitration policy with regard to the
parties' freedom to contract."0 The EEOC decision makes it clear that parties cannot
go beyond common law contract theory and bind non-parties to a contract.2 ' There
is no reason why the courts should be exempt from this proposition. In fact, it would
seem that the courts, which are a public resource, should be an even greater

the terms of the arbitration agreement, because the court must follow the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. See 28
U.S.C. § 2071 (1994); FED. RULES CIV. PROC. Rule 1, 28 U.S.C. (1994); CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT ET AL., FEDERAL
PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 1011 (2d ed. 1969).
194. See Edward T. Harris, Alternative Dispute Resolution: Panacea or Anathema? 99 HARV. L. REV. 668,
678 (stating that "a potential danger of ADR is that disputants who seek only understanding and reconciliation may
treat as irrelevant the choices made by our law makers"); see also Ayres & Gertner, supra note 57, at 124 (noting
that legal formalities lower costs of subsequent decision making).
195. Volt, 489 U.S. at 478 (citing Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1, 10 (1984)).
196. id.
197. Bowen, 254 F.3d at 932 (citing ARW Exploration Corp. v. Aguirre, 45 F.3d, 1455, 1462 (10th Cir.
1995)).
198. See Ware, supra note 40, at 711.
199. Smit, supra note 6, at 149. Equally, keeping arbitration and litigation separate may actually force parties
to think more about the choice to litigate the case or to go to arbitration. See Sabin, supra note 1, at 1364. Without
that hard choice, parties may be more willing to craft hybrids of arbitration/litigation. Id. This may lessen the
efficiency of arbitration because the parties may have chosen one or the other. Id.
200. EEOC, 122 S. Ct. at 754.
201. Id.
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concern. 22 Given this, it would seem that parties to an arbitration agreement cannot
bind the court to an agreement that it had no say in.
Moreover, the Tenth Circuit recognized that the Supreme Court has explicitly
noted that the judiciary and arbitration are different forums entirely.23 The Court in
Gilmer stated that when parties agree to arbitrate, they trade the "procedures and
opportunity for review of the courtroom for the simplicity, informality, and
expedition of arbitration. 2' '° In an earlier case, the Court recognized that when
parties agree to arbitrate, they are authorizing the arbitrator to give meaning to the
contract. 5 The Court then explained, "though the arbitrator's decision must draw
its essence from the agreement, he is to bring his informed judgment to bear in order
to reach a fair solution of a problem. This is especially true when it comes to
formulating remedies."2" Equally, the Court has made it clear that when parties
submit their claims to arbitration, they submit "to their resolution in an arbitral,
rather than ajudicial, forum., 207 Though the Court has expressly held that the courts
are not hostile to arbitration, 0 8 they have made it clear that there are differences
between the two forums and these differences are an integral reason why parties
choose arbitration over litigation.2°
B. Neither the FAA nor Supreme Court Cases Explicitly Require That Arbitration
and Adjudication Be Separate
Though the Tenth Circuit recognized that the FAA does not explicitly allow for
the expansion of judicial review by private contract, it found that arbitration and
adjudication must be kept "independent. ' '2'0 This argument is no less reasonable than
the Fifth and Ninth Circuits' argument that parties to an arbitration agreement
21
should be allowed to expand judicial review by contract because of FAA policy. '
There is no indication in the legislative history of the FAA or in Supreme Court
precedent that parties to an arbitration agreement cannot ask the court to intervene
more than articulated in the FAA. The Supreme Court has found that the purpose of

202. This concern of binding a non-party to a contract seems even more important with regard to this issue
of changing judicial review by private contract. Parties to an arbitration agreement are analyzing their wants and
desires from their perspective, but the courts are confronted with two choices: to make the parties whole and to
protect the integrity and the efficiency of the courts. See Harry T. Edwards, Alternative Dispute Resolution: Panacea
or Anathema, 99 HARV. L. REV. 668,676-77 (1986). The courts cannot make informed decisions on the use of these
public resources if they are not informed prior to the agreement and are not given the opportunity to determine
whether the agreement is in the interests of the judicial system. Equally, Congress, who creates the laws, is an
indirect nonparty to the agreement. Never agreeing to the expanded review, Congress's power to make laws and
have those laws enforced by the courts is usurped by private contract.
203. Garvey, 121 S. Ct. 1724.
204. Bowen, 254 F.3d at 935.
205. United Paperworkers Int'l Union, AFL-CIO v. Misco, Inc., 484 U.S. 29, 41 (1987).
206. Id.
207. Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 628 (1985).
208. See Shearson/American Express, Inc. v. McMahon, 482 U.S. 220 (1987).
209. With less discovery, fewer rules of evidence, and typically less formality, arbitration is not a full-blown
trial with all the rules and procedures in place as checks upon the decision maker and the court proceeding itself.
See Schwartz, supra note 48, at 25 (arguing that the efficiency and informality of the arbitration decision-making
process is the virtue that makes arbitration less in quality than the court process). Thus, arbitral integrity is naturally
going to be less than the courts. Id.
210. Bowen, 254 F.3d at 935.
211. Gateway, 64 F.3d at 997; La Pine, 130 F.3d at 888.
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the FAA was to "overrule the judiciary's longstanding refusal to enforce agreements
to arbitrate" and "to place an arbitration agreement upon the same footing as other
contracts."2" 2 Thus, it was the courts refusal to enforce arbitration agreements that
prompted the FAA rather than an attempt to keep private individuals from
expanding judicial review. In fact, it would seem that Congress never thought that
private individuals would attempt to expand judicial review by private contract
because of the judicial hostility towards arbitration at the time of inception of the
FAA.213
Yet, the Bowen court argued that Sections 10 and 11 of the FAA establish the
"federal policy favoring arbitration by preserving the independence of the arbitration
process. 21 4 Though it is clear that the review standards articulated in Sections 10
and 11 of the FAA are strict, these sections mandate that the court vacate, modify,
or correct the award under those strict review standards upon the request of one of
the parties to the agreement, but it does not stipulate that parties cannot agree to alter
these review standards prior to the dispute. 2'5 Thus, it would seem that Congress was
concerned that the court, through one party's request, would not enforce the contract
according to its terms; but it does not seem that the FAA was promulgated to keep
adjudication and arbitration separate or not to allow both parties to agree to
expansion of review beyond that articulated in the FAA. 21 6 In fact, there may be
strong policy justifications under the FAA for allowing for expanded judicial review
in certain circumstances." 7 The Supreme Court has explicitly stated that it favors
arbitration laws and rules that increase the use of arbitration, so long as those rules
do not do violence to the policies of the FAA. 1 8 If some form of expansion actually
increases the use of arbitration, it may be justified under the FAA to allow for some
expansion of judicial review.21 9
Equally, Supreme Court cases that recognize arbitration and adjudication are
different do not establish a draconian rule that there should not be an increased level
of judicial review at some level.220 Certainly, the Court may recognize that there are
differences, and that the two forums should be independent, but there is no
indication that the Supreme Court's justification for noting the differences between
arbitration and adjudication are based on the FAA's policy mandating the
independence of arbitration and litigation.221 In fact, the Supreme Court has found

212.

Byrd, 470 U.S. at 219-20 (citing H.R. REP. NO. 96 (1924)).

213. See Rau, supra note 6, at 230-31.
214. 254 F.3d at 935.
215. See 9 U.S.C. § 10 (noting that "[the court] may make an order vacating the award upon the application
of any party to the arbitration").
216. See Rau, supra note 6, at 231 ("[Section] 10 serves to assure the parties to an arbitral proceeding that
they need not fear an officious or meddlesome inquiry into the merits.").
217. See Ware, supra note 6; Younger, supra note 6.
218. Volt, 489 U.S. at 479.
219. Statutory "opt-in" review is one such method that may actually increase the use of arbitration. See Ware,
supra note 6, at 263.
220. See generally First Options of Chicago, Inc. v. Kaplan, 514 U.S. 938, 942-43 (1995) (stating that who
should decide the issue of arbitrability depends on what the parties agreed to, but does not turn on the difference

between the two forums).
221. See Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 628 ("[A] party does not
forgo the substantive rights afforded by the statute; it only submits to their resolution in an arbitral, rather than a
judicial, forum.").
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that "rules which are manifestly designed to encourage resort to the arbitral process
' Given the fact that
simply do[] not offend.. .polic[ies] embodied in the FAA."222
expansion of judicial review by private contract may actually increase the use of
arbitration, the policy justification adopted by the Tenth Circuit seems weak.
In a similar vein, the Tenth Circuit's argument that expanding judicial review
would weaken the differences between arbitration and adjudication and does
violence to the policies of the FAA is also no less tenable.223 The Supreme Court has
made it clear that parties may create agreements as they see fit and the court is not
to determine the wisdom of that agreement.224 The Tenth Circuit's determination that
arbitration allows for "creative decision making" and that this flexibility of the
arbitration process would be lost if judicial review by private contract were allowed
seems to do violence to the Supreme Court holding.225 The Tenth Circuit's
determination assumes that the parties want creativity and flexibility when the
parties contract for arbitration. But what if parties want a more formal, trial-type
arbitration? Should they be denied this type of arbitration because the court does not
think it is wise? The Tenth Circuit seems to be making a policy judgment on the
proper role of arbitration, determining that it would be unwise to allow parties to
freely contract for expanded review under the FAA because what they really want
is a creative decision maker.226 This type of argument seems contrary to Supreme
Court precedent that mandates that courts should not sit to determine the wisdom of
the terms of the arbitration agreement.227 Thus, the argument that the purpose of the
FAA was to keep arbitration and adjudication separate because it would harm the
creative decision-making process of arbitration does not seem reasonable given FAA
policy and Supreme Court precedent.
Besides the fact that the argument that the pro-arbitration policies of the FAA
require keeping arbitration and adjudication separate is weak, this argument also
conflicts with the argument that parties cannot interfere with the judicial process.228
This conflict can be shown with a very simple example. Suppose parties to an
arbitration agreement choose not to expand judicial review, but choose to contract
the standards of review narrower than those articulated in the FAA. If the argument
is that parties cannot interfere with the judicial process then parties cannot narrow
the standards below those set out in the FAA. But if the argument is that one of the
purposes for the FAA standards is to keep arbitration and litigation independent of
each other, then contraction of the standards set out in the FAA would further the
goals of the FAA by further limiting the courts' role in deciding the legitimacy of
the arbitration award. In short, because the Tenth Circuit's two rationales are not
based on the same purposes, they conflict.
Given this, it seems that the main justification for the Tenth Circuit's holding was
to protect the courts from interference by private individuals. The Tenth Circuit

222.
223.
224.
225.
226.
227.
228.

Volt, 489 U.S. at 476.
Bowen, 254 F.3d at 935-36.
Byrd, 470 U.S. at 221.
Id.
Bowen, 254 F.3d at 936.
See Byrd, 470 U.S. at 221.
Bowen, 254 F.3d at 934-36.
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explicitly states that "through the FAA Congress has provided explicit guidance
regardingjudicial standards of review of arbitrationawards.229 This seems to
indicate that the Tenth Circuit's focus was not on the policies of the FAA per se, but
on following the edicts of Congress. In fact, the Tenth Circuit stated in a footnote,
"[b]ecause we hold that, in the absence of clear authority to the contrary, parties
may not interfere with the judicial process by dictating how the federal courts
operate, we need not decide whether contractually created standards impermissibly
attempt to create federal jurisdiction." 230 Thus, it seems that the main concern of the
Tenth Circuit was not whether the policies of the FAA mandate that23the judiciary be
kept separate, but that parties may not interfere with the judiciary. '
C. If Congress Does Not Explicitly GrantPowers to Private Partiesto Expand
JudicialReview by Contract,the Courts Should Not Allow Them to Override the
TraditionalStandardsSet Out in the FAA
The Tenth Circuit's decision that the FAA does not explicitly grant the courts the
power to allow for the private expansion of judicial review was a wise decision.232
Although the decisions to uphold the expansion of judicial review are based on the
federal policy favoring arbitration, this deference to arbitration should not allow
private parties to usurp powers specifically granted to Congress under the
Constitution.233 The decisions allowing private parties to expand judicial review,
because they take the more efficient route of arbitration, allow parties to stipulate
to the courts how it should conduct its affairs, something that could not happen had
they chosen to go to court directly.2 34 It allows parties to contract around the rules
of judicial review, overriding the Rules of Civil Procedure and common law, by
private contract, thus usurping the lawmaking powers of Congress and the
judiciary's role of interpreting those laws.235

229. Bowen, 254 F3d at 934 (emphasis added) (citing Prima Paint Corp., 388 U.S. at 45).
230. Id. at 937 n.8 (emphasis added). But see id. at 936 n.7 (reiterating Revised Uniform Arbitration Act
comment that expanded judicial review through opt-in clause would allow for a "second bite at the apple").
231. Because this holding implies that parties may not expand or contract judicial review by private contract,
the implications of contraction of judicial review will not be discussed. Bowen, 254 F.3d at 933 (stating that parties
may not alter the traditional standards of review). Theoretically, parties could mutually agree to contract the
standards of review below those standards articulated in the FAA, though there would be no reason why parties
would agree to an arbitration that would be unfair or unconscionable. But it is important to note that if the policies
of the FAA allow for the contraction of judicial review, this could allow some businesses to completely abrogate
the review standards of the FAA in consumer arbitration clauses. Simply, consumers who do not know the law and
agree to purchase goods that contain an arbitration agreement that contracts the standards of review below those
of the FAA could agree to review standards that allowed the arbitrator to commit fraud, duress, or any other
unconscionable act. Of course, the court could determine that this type of clause is unconscionable because
arbitration agreements carry the same weight as other contractual agreements, but not more so. See Waffle House,
122 S.Ct. at 754. Thus, under state contract law, an arbitration agreement procured by fraud would most likely be
considered unconscionable under state law, and therefore void. See Ware, supra note 6, at 269 ("[G]enerally
applicable contract defenses.. .may be applied to invalidate arbitration agreements."); Schwartz, supra note 39
(criticizing the Court's policy favoring arbitration in binding pre-dispute arbitration agreements between consumers
and businessmen).
232. Bowen, 254 F.3d at 934.
233. See generally Ex Parte New Orleans City Bank, 44 U.S. 292 (1845); Wayman v. Southard, 23 U.S. 1
(1825); Livingston v. Story, 34 U.S. 632 (1835).
234. Byrd, 470 U.S. at 220 n.7 (noting, "[the FAA] creates no new legislation, grants no new rights").
235. See 28 U.S.C. § 2701 (1994).
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The court has developed over hundreds of years to uphold the law and to do that
which is equitable. 236 Fine-tuning and slight tweaks through case precedent and
statute have created a courtroom designed to make the people feel it is equitable and
just, though it may be rigid and inflexible at times. 2 7 By allowing parties to change
the laws governing the courtroom, parties affect this fine line that the judiciary must
walk: the judge must do that which is equitable and follow the law.238 If it allows
parties to shun case precedent and ask the court to act differently, perhaps more like
an arbitrator, private parties may be affecting the power balance and integrity of the
courtroom.23 9 Judges may be asked to review a record created by a non-lawyer not
versed in "legalese" or asked to use standards that are not easily reviewable by
courts. 240 Thus, courts would be required to act as arbitrators to decide issues, not
as judges.24'
Of course, the courts could develop precedent that would limit the amount of
intervention into the courts by private contract. But could this decision be justified
under the FAA if the policies of the FAA, according to the argument, require that
the court follow the parties' contract according to its terms? 242 There seems to be
nothing stopping the parties to the contract from requiring a court to review an
arbitrator's award below the standards that a court would review a trial court's
award, or under differing standards. In fact, if the parties so chose, they could
require the court, after an appellate review of an award that the court finds to be
unjustified, to grant the parties a trial under rules and procedures that the parties
adopt merely because the parties agreed to arbitrate the claim first and had stipulated
in that agreement that they would go to trial governed by their own adopted rules
and procedures if the review court should overturn the award. But why stop there?
If parties have the power to change the rules of the courts because they chose
arbitration prior to litigation, why shouldn't the parties be able to stipulate that the
court shall act as arbitrator and then agree to their own trial court rules and
procedures in the agreement, doing away with the middleman-the private
arbitrator. Thus, because the parties agreed to arbitrate the claim and chose the judge
as their arbitrator, the courts would be bound by the parties' decision and the judge
would have to act as arbitrator, following the rules and procedures adopted by the
parties. Certainly, these arguments seem ridiculous, but under the holdings of the
Fifth and Ninth Circuits, it would seem that the court would be required to stand on
243
its head if the parties contracted for it.

236. See Pound, infra note 237, at 63.
237. ROSCOE POUND, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE PHILOSOPHY OF LAW 63 (1954) ( "[N]ow, as in the Sixteenth
and the Seventeenth Century reaction from the strict law, come those who would turn over the whole field of
judicial justice to administrative methods.").
238. Id.
239. See generally id.; Fuller, supra note 56.
240. Rau, supra note 6, at 252.
241. See Harris, supra note 194, at 768 (noting that judges are experts at law and should decide issues of law
and that "nonlegal" values should be handled by "substantive expertise").
242. See generally La Pine, 64 F.3d at 888; Gateway, 64 F.3d at 996-98.
243. See Rau, supra note 6, at 248 ("Can the value of private autonomy justify... allow[ing] parties to
create... innovative and 'exotic,' procedures?").
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Courts do review other forums, such as administrative agencies and the like.244
Yet it is important to note that these forums, and the standards that govern the
review of these proceedings and awards, are imposed on the courts by statute245 or
develop through the common law.246 There is no reason why legislators, both state
and federal, could not incorporate differing standards into arbitration law that would
be more consistent with the roles of the courts.247 Given that there are strong policy
reasons on both sides of the argument for and against the expansion of judicial
review,248 the balancing of these different policy concerns should not be for the
courts when the courts have clear rules that Congress has developed and parties to
the arbitration process have an infinite number of ways that they may protect their
interests.249
The court's role, as formal and traditional as it is, serves a function that is
distinctly different from arbitration.25 ° The court, though deciding private matters,
is not in the "free market" selling its judicial wares, but is instead a public resource
controlled by Congress and the judicial branch. 2 1 Congress has chosen to limit
judicial roles and clearly define rules and procedures of the court to protect its
integrity and maximize its efficiency. 2 2 Thus, the concerns of the court should not
be maximizing the use of arbitration. The concern of arbitral integrity should be left
to the states, or Congress, or the parties directly involved with the arbitration forum
to develop techniques to make the process worthwhile for the parties.253
VI. IMPLICATIONS
Because of the reasonings of the Tenth Circuit that there is no statute or court
precedent authorizing private individuals to expand judicial review through an
arbitration agreement and that expansion of judicial review does violence to the
policies of the FAA,254 this decision may have several different implications. The
obvious implication of this decision is that parties who attempt to expand judicial
review by private contract within the jurisdiction of the Tenth Circuit will not be
able to do so. 255 But more profound than this obvious holding is the affect on state
courts and the policies of the FAA depending on the reasoning that the courts adopt
to justify the holding. If the Tenth Circuit adopts the reasoning that the policies of

244.

See generally Kenneth Culp Davis and Richard J. Pierce, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE, §§ 8.1-11.5

(1994).
245. See, e.g., Younger, supra note 6, at 260 (discussing automatic rights of appeal under "rent-a-judge"
statutes).
246. See Davis, supra note 244, § 11.2.

247. One argument is that courts should allow parties to contract for legal errors to be reviewed under less
strict standards. See generally Ware, supra note 6; Rau, supra note 6.

248. See articles cited in supra note 6.
249. See Bowen, 254 F.3d at 934 (stating that "if parties desire broader appellate review, they can contract

for an appellate arbitration panel to review the arbitrator's award"); Sabin, supra note I (analyzing numerous
arbitration reform proposals).
250. See Harris, supra note 194, at 676-77.
251. Id.

252. Id.
253. It is important to note that whenever the courts do get involved in the process, it becomes more formal.
See Stempel, supra note 41, at 270-7 1.
254. Bowen, 254 F.3d at 934-3Z
255. Id. at 937.
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the FAA mandate the independence of arbitration, this holding may have deleterious
effects on state legislators who wish to experiment with opt-in clauses or other
arbitration/adjudication hybrids that affect the independence of arbitration and
adjudication.256 Yet, the argument that private parties to a contract cannot dictate to
the federal judiciary how it should run its affairs would not have this affect because
it does not affect the holding of Volt and, therefore, does not affect the policies of
the FAA, though it does affect arbitration generally. Thus, depending on the
reasoning the court adopts, the holding of the Tenth Circuit could have profound
affects on the future of arbitration and the FAA.
Before an analysis of the implications of this case under the Volt holding, it is
necessary to analyze this case with regard to its holding on state laws affecting
arbitration. The Volt court held that "application of the California statute is not preempted by the [FAA] when the state laws allowed for stay of arbitration pending
' Because
litigation."257
the contract agreed upon by the parties contained a "choiceof-law clause providing that 'the contract shall be governed where the project is
located,"' which was California, the state law allowing for a stay of arbitration was
granted.258 The court reasoned that there
is no federal policy favoring arbitration under a certain set of procedural rules;
the federal policy is simply to ensure the enforceability, according to their terms,
of private agreements to arbitrate.. .rules which are manifestly designed to
encourage resort to the arbitral process simply do[] not offend.. .policy embodied
in the FAA.259
The Supreme Court found that the fact that "[Sections] 3 and 4 of the FAA are
fully applicable in state-court proceedings" did not prevent parties from adopting
state rules.26 ° The court reasoned that "[t]he FAA contains no express pre-emptive
provision, nor does it reflect a congressional intent to occupy the entire field of
arbitration," finding that "state law may nonetheless be pre-empted to the extent that
it... would undermine the goals and policies of the FAA."26 ' Thus, if parties to an
arbitration agreement adopt state laws that do not completely abrogate agreements
to arbitrate, the state laws must be enforced according to their terms so long as they
2 62
do not do violence to the policies of the FAA.
The Volt court seems to imply that the states should be free to experiment with
arbitration rules and procedures, so long as they do not do violence to the policies
of the FAA.2 6' Expansion of judicial review does not completely abrogate a party's
agreement to arbitrate.2 " In fact, it seems to have some benefits that may actually

256. See generallyWare, supra note 6, at 269-70.
257. 489 U.S. at 470, 476.
258. For an interesting discussion of this case and its choice of law holding, see Note, An UnnecessaryChoice
of Low: Volt, Mastrobuono, and Federal Arbitration Act Preemption, 115 HARV. L. REV. 2250 (2002).
259. Volt, 489 U.S. at 476.
260. Id. at 477.
261. Id. at 477-78.
262. Id. at 478-79; see also Ware, supra note 6, at 269 (noting that "the FAA preempt[s] state anti-contract
law").
263. Volt, 489 U.S. at 477.
264. See Ware, supra note 6, at 269-71.
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increase the use of arbitration.265 It would seem that allowing parties to expand
judicial review, in and of itself, does not do violence to the policies of the FAA.
Yet the Tenth Circuit's argument that the policies of the FAA mandate that the
courts and arbitration be independent and that allowing for the expansion of judicial
review does violence to the policies of the FAA seems to expand the holding in Volt
beyond that articulated in the case itself.266 Because the Tenth Circuit used the Volt

holding to justify its decision that judicial expansion does violence to the policies
of the FAA, the FAA pre-empts any law or agreement that expands judicial review
or decreases the independence of arbitration and adjudication at some level. 267 Thus,
state legislators in the Tenth Circuit's jurisdiction are precluded from statutorily
allowing for expansion of judicial review through opt-in provisions, nor are they
allowed the opportunity to experiment with arbitration if it affects the independence
of arbitration and the courts, though it might actually increase the use of arbitration
and reduce court dockets, typical justifications for adopting arbitration generally.
Equally, parties to an arbitration agreement who adopt state laws that allow for
varying standards will not be able to have those standards enforced in the Tenth
Circuit.
Though the argument that expansion of judicial review by private contract does
violence to the policies of the FAA, the argument that private parties cannot dictate
to the courts how they should review arbitration awards does not preclude state
courts from adopting varying standards of review. This argument only disallows
private parties from affecting the judicial process, but it does not make any
pronouncement on the policies of the FAA-for good or for ill. In fact, the court in
Volt made it clear that the FAA is not the only arbitration act that can be adopted by
parties to an arbitration agreement. 268 Thus, state legislators may adopt opt-in
provisions into their arbitration acts and parties to an arbitration agreement may
choose these laws as part of their agreement, even in cases where the FAA would
be controlling. 269 Accordingly, because this holding does not affect the policies of
the FAA, states would still have the power to create legislation to allow parties to
an arbitration agreement to expand judicial review beyond the standards articulated
in the FAA so long as those same laws do not abrogate the agreement entirely.
Clearly, the effects of each reason that the court gave could have a huge impact
on how state legislators may create effective and legitimate rules and procedures for
arbitration proceedings.
VII. CONCLUSION
The Tenth Circuit's decision that parties may not interfere with the judicial
process upholds the integrity of the process. As Lon Fuller stated,
265. See Rau, supra note 6, at 247; Younger, supra note 6, at 262 (noting that heightened judicial review may
curb arbitrator's maverick impulses).
266.

Volt, 468 U.S. 477-78.

267. Id. at 476.
268.

Volt, 489 U.S. at 477-78.

269. Of course, parties to the agreement would essentially be choosing to expand the scope ofjudicial review,
but they would not have free rein to adopt any rules that they so choose that may affect the federal courts. See

generally Ware, supra note 6. Equally, the federal courts could still control the state laws through the "violence to
the policies of the FAA" holding in Volt. Volt, 489 U.S. at 479.

NEW MEXICO LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 33

[adjudication] assumes a burden of rationality not borne by any other form of
social ordering. A decision which is the product of reasoned argument must be
prepared itself to meet the test of reason. We demand of an adjudicative decision
a kind of rationality we do not expect of the results of contract or of voting."
It is this demand of rationality that has constricted the courts and required them
to follow rules and procedures developed over years of practical application. It
would be a radical move for the judiciary to allow parties to privately alter this
system.
Though the former argument is sound, the court's determination that the
expansion of judicial review does violence to the policies of the FAA could hinder
state legislators from developing standards and procedures whereby expanded
review by a court of an arbitration award may actually benefit both the courts and
the quality of the arbitration process itself. As the Tenth Circuit recognized, this was
a "difficult question."27 ' Though all the reasoning of the decision is not reasonable,
it seems that the Tenth Circuit is heading in the right direction.

270. Lon L. Fuller, The Forms and Limits of Adjudication,92 HARV. L. REV. 353, 366-67 (1978).
271. Bowen, 254 F.3d at 933.

